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Online Participatory Sensing in Double Auction
Environment with Location Information
Jaya Mukhopadhyay, Vikash Kumar Singh, Sajal Mukhopadhyay, Anita Pal
Abstract—As mobile devices have been ubiquitous, partic-
ipatory sensing emerges as a powerful tool to solve many
contemporary real life problems. Here, we contemplate the
participatory sensing in online double auction environment by
considering the location information of the participating agents.
In this paper we propose a truthful mechanism in this setting
and the mechanism also satisfies the other economic properties
such as budget balance and individual rationality.
Index Terms—Participatory sensing, location information, on-
line double auction.
I. Introduction
PARTICIPATORY SENSING [8][13] is a distributed prob-lem solving model in which the common people (may
not be professionals) of indefinite size carrying smart devices
(such as Tablets, smart watches, smartphones, etc.) may be
engaged to accomplish the tasks or sub-tasks. Examples in-
clude measuring the level of smokes and toxic gases present
in the environment of certain industrial area [20][17], keeping
track of auto-mobiles traffic condition in highly populated
urban areas [12][10], monitoring the state of the roads (eg.
patholes, bumps, etc.) by attaching sensors to cars [18], and
several directions in healthcare and physical fitness [2][1]. In a
typical participatory sensing model, there exists three different
participating community namely; (a) task requester(s), (b)
platform (or third party), and (c) task executer(s). The working
of participatory sensing system is initiated by the task re-
quester(s) who submit their sensory task(s) to the platform that
is/are to be accomplished by the common people incorporated
with smart devices. Once the third party (or platform) receives
the task(s), he/she (henceforth he) outsource the task(s) or
subtask(s) to the group of common people carrying smart de-
vices. In the participatory sensing terminology, these common
people carrying smart devices are termed as task executer(s).
In order to complete the assigned task(s), the task executers
have to utilize their owned smart device resources (such as
battery, GPS system, etc.). Now, the obvious question that may
arise is: how to motivate the task executer(s) to accomplish
the projected task(s) voluntarily by utilizing their resources.
Moreover, it is to be noted that each of the task requesters and
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the task executers (synonymously called agents) are strategic.
In general, strategic means that, the agents chooses their
strategies so as to maximize a well defined individualistic
utility.
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Fig. 1. System model
Answering to above posed question, for motivating the large
group of task executers for voluntary participation, one can
think of the solution to incentivize the participating task
executers by some means, once the task(s) is/are completed.
In this paper, we study a single task execution problem
(STEP); where there are multiple task requesters having
a single common task, that is to be accomplished by the
multiple task executers in an online environment. By online
environment, we mean that the agents arrives in the system
and departs from the system on a regular basis. The proposed
model is shown in Fig. 1. The novelty that is introduced in
this is to develop a game theoretic approach to model the
STEP. As their are multiple task executers and multiple task
requesters, this give rise to a double auction framework.
In our model the location information of the agents are
considered so as to cover a substantial area albeit collecting
to much of redundant data. It is to be noted that the task
executers location information are tracked implicitly during
the supply of the completed tasks to the third party. By
doing so it is guaranteed that the task executers can’t gain by
lying their actual location. The location aware participatory
sensing was first introduced in [11]. However location aware
participatory sensing in online double auction environment
was not addressed in [11]. In this paper we have addressed the
location aware participatory sensing in online DA. To avoid
collecting redundant data, clustering concept is implemented
before running the auction in each round.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• In the participatory sensing scenario, we have proposed a
framework to study the STEP with multiple task executers
2and multiple task requesters in an online environment
by utilizing the concept of clustering along-with auction.
As their are multiple task requesters and multiple task
executers, it is a good choice to model the participatory
sensing scenario using double auction.
• We propose a single task execution mechanism (STEM)
for STEP motivated by [19][4] that takes into account
multiple task executers and multiple task requesters. We
design a truthful (or incentive compatible) mechanism for
this interesting class of problem.
• We have shown that STEM is bounded above by O(kκn2).
Moreover, we have also shown that our STEM satisfies
the several economic properties such as truthfulness,
individual rationality, and Budget balance.
• A substantial amount of simulation is done to compare
STEM with the carefully designed benchmark scheme
(McAfee’s rule).
• We have proved that in the given online environment with
clustering the agents can’t gain by manipulating their
valuation, arrival and departure time in a given arrival-
departure window.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
elucidates the preliminary concepts about participatory sens-
ing. Section III describes our proposed model. The proposed
mechanisms is illustrated in section IV. The paper is concluded
with the possible future directions in section V.
II. Prior works
Recently, there has been a spate of research work at the
border of participatory sensing and in their several applications
areas. In this section we discuss the prior works on partici-
patory sensing, taking into account incentives aspects, quality
of data or information supplied, privacy of the task executers
performing the task, and different set-up participatory sensing
in budget constraint environment.
In order to get a nice overview of the participatory sensing
the readers may refer [22][8][13][7][5]. Currently, the partici-
patory sensing is one of the open research areas. One obvious
question that arise in the participatory sensing environment
is: how to motivate the large common people carrying smart
devices to participate in the system? To answer this question
in a better way, the researchers have provided their immense
effort in this direction. In past, for voluntary participation of
the task executers several incetivizing schemes are discussed in
literature. [21] follows the fixed price payment scheme, where
the winning agents are paid a fixed price as their payment.
However, the fixed price based incentive scheme may not
satisfy the several participating agents because of the amount
of effort they make in the data collection process. Moreover,
the incentive based schemes has got a special attention from
the research community. [16] addresses the incentive scheme
under the reverse auction based setting (single buyer and mul-
tiple sellers). Several incentive schemes has been introduced
in [9][14] [25]. In [3][24][23] efforts have been made by the
researchers to show the effect of quality of data collected by
the agents to the overall system by incorporating the quality
of data to the system in some sense. Some initial research has
been carried out by [8] [23] [15] [6] to preserve the privacy
of the agents so that their private information associated with
the data are not revealed publicly. Recently, [11] provides the
incentive schemes under the location constraints. in their work
they have addressed location aware participatory sensing in
one buyer and multiple seller environment. In our model we
have explored more general multiple sellers-multiple buyers
framework in more challenging location aware participatory
sensing in online double auction environment.
III. System model
In this section, considering an online environment we
formalize a single task execution problem (STEP) for the
participatory sensing scenario. By online environment, we
mean that the agents arrives in the auction market and departs
from the auction market on a regular basis in a given time
horizon  (say a day). Let B = {B1,B2, . . . ,Bm} be the
set of task requesters and S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} be the set
of task executers such that m << n. The task executers and
task requesters are synonymously called agents. Each of the
task executer Si incurs a private cost for performing the
available task termed as valuation given as υe
i
. The set υe
denotes the set of valuations of all the task executers given
as υe = {υe
1
, υe
2
, . . . , υen}. Similar to the task executers, each
of the task requester Bi has some private value for buying
the task after its completion and is given as υr
i
. The set υr
denotes the set of valuations of all task requesters given as
υr = {υr
1
, υr
2
, . . . , υrm}. Each of the task executers and task
requesters places their private information in a sealed bid
manner. It is to be noted that, due to the strategic nature
of the agents, they can mis-report their respective private
values. So, it is convenient to represent the cost reported for
performing the task by the task executer Si as υˆ
e
i
and the value
of task requester Bi for buying the task as υˆ
r
i
. υˆe
i
= υe
i
and
υˆr
i
= υr
i
describes the fact that Si and Bi are not deviating
from their true valuations. In this model, there are multiple
task requesters (as buyers) and multiple task executers (as
sellers). So, this is a perfect setting to model the STEP as an
online double auction problem (ODAP). Due to online nature
of the STEP, one of the realistic parameters that is perceived
in our proposed model is arrival and departure time of the
agents. The arrival time of any agent is the time at which
he/she (henceforth he) knows about the auction market or the
time at which he first become aware of his desire to involve
into the auction market after entering into the system. The
arrival time of each task executer Si and each task requester
Bi are given as a
e
i
and ar
i
respectively. For a task requester,
we interpret the departure time as the final time in which
he values the task. For a task executer, the departure time
is the final time in which he is willing to accept payment.
The departure time of each task executer Si and each task
requester Bi are given as d
e
i
and dr
i
respectively. The agents
may mis-report their respective arrival time or departure time
or both within the arrival-departure window in order to gain.
It is convenient to represent the arrival time of task executer
Si and task requester Bi as aˆ
e
i
and aˆr
i
respectively. Similarly,
more conveniently the departure time of task executer Si and
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e
i
and dˆr
i
respectively. aˆe
i
= ae
i
, aˆr
i
= ar
i
,
dˆe
i
= de
i
, and dˆr
i
= dr
i
describes the fact that Si and Bi are not
misreporting their arrival and departure time. In our proposed
model, a day is termed as time horizon . The time horizon 
is partitioned into several time slots (not necessarily of same
length) given as  = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τs}. For each time slot τi, a
new set of active task requesters R ⊂ B and a new set of
active task executers U ⊂ S arrives in the auction market. At
each time slot τi, considering the newly active task executers
U, a set of clusters of task executers are formed and is given
as: £i = {£i
1
, £i
2
, . . . , £i
k
}; where £i
j
is termed as the jth cluster
for τi time slot. Over the  time horizon the cluster vector can
be given as: £ = {£1, £2, . . . , £s}. Once the clusters are formed,
then for each cluster £i
j
several independent double auction
will be performed. At each time slot τi ∈  and from each
cluster £ j the set of winning task executers-task requesters
are paired. At each time slot τi ∈ , our proposed mechanism
matches one task executer to one task requester in a cluster.
More formally, a mechanism M = (A, P), where, A is called
an allocation function and P is called a payment function. The
allocation functionA maps the pair of task executers valuation
and task requesters valuation to the possible task executer-task
requester pairs. Following the payment function, the payment
of each task executer Si and each task requester Bi is given
as Pe
i
and Pr
i
respectively. As the task executers and task
requesters are strategic in nature, they will try to maximize
their utility. The utility of any task executer is defined as the
difference between the payment received by the task executer
and the true valuation of the task executer. More formally,
the utility of Si is ϕ
e
i
= Pe
i
− υe
i
, if Si wins otherwise 0.
Similarly, the utility of any task requester is defined as the
difference between the true valuation of the task requester
and the payment he pays. More formally, the utility of Bi
is ϕr
i
= υr
i
− Pr
i
, if Bi wins 0 otherwise.
IV. STEM: Proposed mechanism
A. Outline of STEM
In order to present the brief idea of the STEM to the readers
the outline of the STEM is discussed before going into the
detailed view. The outline of the STEM can be thought of as
a three stage process:
 For any auction round t ∈  find out the active task
executers and task requesters.
 Cluster the active task executers based on k-means clus-
tering technique.
 Run the online double auction separately for each cluster
of task executers. Task requesters will be the same for all
the clusters.
B. Sketch of the STEM
The three stage STEM can further be studied under four
different sections: Main routine, Cluster formation, Payment,
and Allocation. First, the sub-part of the proposed mechanism
i.e. the Main routine phase is discussed and presented. The
Cluster formation phase is addressed next. Next, the crucial
part of the proposed mechanism i.e. payment phase motivated
by [4] is discussed and presented. Finally, one of the allocation
phase is addressed.
1) Main routine: The idea lies behind the construction of
Main routine is to handle the system partitioned into different
time slots τi ∈ . The input to the Main routine are the set of
task executers at τi time slot i.e. Sτi , the set of available task
requesters at τi time slot i.e. Bτi , the overall time horizon i.e.
, the set of cost of execution of all task executers i.e. υˆe, and
the set of value for buying the executed tasks by all the task
requesters i.e. υˆr. The output is the set of allocation vector A.
In line 2, the several data structures that are utilized in main
routine are set to φ. The for loop in line 3 iterates over all the
time slots τi ∈ . In line 4, the active TE() function returns
the set of active task executers at time slot τi and is held in U
data structure. Whereas, the set of active task requesters at any
time slot τi is determined by the function active TR() and is
held in R data structure. The for loop in line 6−8 iterates over
the set of active task executers U and keeps track of costs of
the members in set U in γe data structure. Similarly, the for
loop in line 9−11 iterates over the set of active task requesters
R and keeps track of values of the members in set R in γr
data structure.
Algorithm 1 Main routine(Sτi, Bτi , , υˆ
e, υˆr)
Output: A ← {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}
1: begin
2: U ← φ, R ← φ, γe ← φ, γr ← φ, £∗e ← φ, £
∗
r ← φ
3: for all τi ∈  do
4: U ← active TE (Sτi , τi) ⊲ ∀Si ∈ U, aˆ
e
i
≤ τi < dˆ
e
i
5: R ← active TR (Bτi , τi) ⊲ ∀Bi ∈ R, aˆ
r
i
≤ τi < dˆ
r
i
6: for each Si ∈ U do
7: γe ← γe ∪ Si · υˆ
e
i
⊲ υˆe
i
is the valuation
component of Si
8: end for
9: for each Bi ∈ R do
10: γr ← γr ∪Bi · υˆ
r
i
⊲ υˆr
i
is the valuation
component of Bi
11: end for
12: £i ← Cluster formation (U, k)
13: for each £i
j
∈ £i do
14: Uc ← S ort ascend(£
i
j
, Si · γ
e
i
) ⊲ Sorting based
on γe
i
∈ γe for all Si ∈ £
i
j
15: R ← S ort descend(R, Bi · γ
r
i
) ⊲ Sorting based
on γr
i
∈ γr for all Bi ∈ R
16: Payment (Uc,R)
17: U
′( j)
c ← U
′( j)
c ∪ U
∗
c
18: R′( j) ← R′( j) ∪ Rc
19: £∗e ← £
∗
e ∪ U
′( j)
c
20: £∗r ← £
∗
r ∪ R
′( j)
21: Uc ← φ
22: end for
23: γe ← φ, γr ← φ
24: New task executers and task requesters comes.
25: Sτi ← £
∗
e ∪ {new task executers}
26: Bτi ← £
∗
r ∪ {new task requesters}
27: end for
28: return A
29: end
In line 12, a call to Cluster formation(U, k) is made; where
4k is the number of clusters to be formed. Once in a particular
time slot τi the cluster set £
i is formed in line 12, the payment
and based on the payment the allocation is determined which
is captured by the for loop in line 13-22. In line 14 and 15 the
task executers and task requesters are sorted in ascending and
descending order respectively. In line 16, a call to payment
phase is done. In line 17 and 18 all the active task executers
and task requesters at time τi in j
th cluster which are not
paired are placed in U
′( j)
c and in R
′( j) respectively. The £∗e and
£∗r data structures keeps track of all the active task executers
and task requesters in a given time slot τi but not allocated in
there respective clusters. In line 21, the Uc data structure is
set to φ. The data structure γe and γr are set to φ. Now, the
new task executers and new task requesters are arriving in the
market for the next time slot as depicted in line 24. In line
25-26 Sτi and Bτi captures the set of all task executers and
task requesters that are going to participate in the next time
slot. Line 28 returns the final allocation set A.
2) Cluster formation: The input to the Cluster formation
are the set of active task executers at any time slot τi given as
U, and the number of cluster to be formed i.e k. Considering
the centroid determination phase, Line 2 initializes the C
data structure utilized in the Cluster formation algorithm. The
random() function in line 4 randomly picks a point as a
centroid from the available point set X. The randomly selected
centroid is placed in C data structure using line 5.
Algorithm 2 Cluster formation (U, k)
1: begin
2: C ← φ ⊲ k centroid determination
3: while |C| , k do
4: x∗ ← random(X) ⊲ Picking a random point Xℓ ∈ X
5: C ← C ∪ {x∗}
6: end while
7: repeat ⊲ k cluster formation
8: £i ← φ, £i
j
← φ
9: for each Sk ∈ U do
10: for each X j ∈ C do
11: D′ ← D′ ∪ {D(Sk,X j)} ⊲ Distance between
Sk and X j
12: end for
13: j∗ ← argmin j D
′
14: £i
j∗
← £i
j∗
∪ {Sk}
15: end for
16: C ← φ
17: for j = 1 to k do
18: £i ← £i ∪ £i
j
19: end for
20: for each £i
j
∈ £i do
21: X′
j
= 1
|£i
j
|
∑
xℓ∈£
i
j
xℓ ⊲ xℓ is the point ℓ i.e. a two
dimensional vector in cluster £i
j
22: C ← C ∪ X′
j
23: end for
24: until change in cluster takes place
25: return £i
26: end
In line 3 the while loop ensures that the loop terminates
when the size of k-centroid are determined. Line 8 initializes
the £i
j
← φ and £i ← φ. The for loop in line 9 iterates over
the active set of task executers U. Line 10-12 determines the
closest distance of each Sk to a centroid X j. The £
i
j∗
in line
14 keeps track of each Sk. In line 16, the C data structure is
set to φ. The £i data structure keeps track of all the clusters
formed in a particular time slot τi as depicted in line 17− 19.
Line 20 − 23 determines the new centroids. The procedure in
line 7-24 will be repeated until the change in the cluster is
seen. Line 25 returns the set of cluster in any particular time
slot τi.
3) Payment: The input to the payment phase are the set of
winning task executers i.e. Uc, and the set of winning task
requesters i.e. R. In line 2 the Uˆ and Rˆ data structure are set
to φ. The for loop in line 3-15 keeps track of payment of the
winning task executers. The check in line 3 confirms that if
the task executer belongs to freshly arrived category then the
payment is decided by line 5 of the Algorithm 4 otherwise
the payment is made using line 7. Now, the check in line 9 is
done to guarantee that the payment made to any task executer
Si is greater than its cost for executing the task i.e. satisfying
the important economic property individual rationality.
Algorithm 3 Payment (Uc, R)
1: begin
2: Uˆ ← φ, Rˆ ← φ
3: for each Si ∈ Uc do
4: if aˆe
i
== τi then ⊲ Fresh arrival
5: χe
i
← minρe∈[dˆe
i
−κ, τi]
{Pe
i
(ρe)}
6: else ⊲ Still active
7: χe
i
← min{Pe
i
(τi − 1),P
e
i
(τi)}
8: end if
9: if χe
i
≥ υˆe
i
then
10: Pe ← Pe ∪ {χ
e
i
}
11: Uˆ ← Uˆ ∪ {Si}
12: else:
13: Si is priced out.
14: end if
15: end for
16: for each Bi ∈ R do
17: if aˆr
i
== τi then ⊲ Fresh arrival
18: χr
i
← maxρr∈[dˆr
i
−κ, τi]
{Pr
i
(ρr)}
19: else ⊲ Still active
20: χr
i
← max{Pr
i
(τi − 1),P
r
i
(τi)}
21: end if
22: if χr
i
≤ υˆr
i
then
23: Pr ← Pr ∪ {χ
r
i
}
24: Rˆ ← Rˆ ∪ {Bi}
25: else:
26: Bi is priced out.
27: end if
28: end for
29: Allocation(Uˆ, Rˆ, γe, γr)
30: end
The Pe data structure in line 10 keeps track of all the
payment of all the winning task executers satisfying the
5individual rationality. If the condition in line 9 is not satisfied
by the task executers, then the winning task executers are
priced out of the market as depicted in line 13. The for
loop in line 16-28 keeps track of payment of the winning
task requesters. The check in line 17 confirms that if the
task requester belongs to freshly arrived category then the
payment is decided by line 17 otherwise the payment is made
using line 19. Now, the check in line 21 is done to guarantee
that the payment made by any task executer Si is no more
than its value for buying the completed task i.e. satisfying
the important economic property individual rationality. The
Pr data structure in line 22 keeps track of all the payment
of all the winning task requesters satisfying the individual
rationality. If the condition in line 22 is not satisfied then the
winning task requester is priced out of the market as depicted
in line 26. Finally, a call to the allocation phase is done line
29.
Payment function: For determining the payment of each
agent the valuation of the first losing task executer and losing
task requester is taken into consideration which is given by
I∗
j
= argmaxi{γ
r
i
− γe
i
< 0} such that γr
i
= Bi · υˆ
r
i
and γe
i
=
Si · υˆ
e
i
. For defining the payment, we further require to fetch
the valuation of the task requester and the task executer at the
index position I∗
j
. The valuation of the task requester at any
index position is captured by the bijective function Υr : Z →
R≥0, whereas the valuation of the task executer at any index
position is captured by the bijective function Υe : Z → R≥0.
Let us further denote the valuation of the task requester at
the index position I∗
j
by Υr(I∗
j
) and the valuation of the task
executer at I∗
j
by Υe(I∗
j
). For determining the payment of all
winning task executers and task requesters we will take the
help of the average of the cost of the task executer at I∗
j
and
the value of the task requester at I∗
j
given as η=
Υr(I∗
j
)+Υe(I∗
j
)
2
.
Mathematically, the payment of ith task executer is given as:
Pei (τi) =



η, if Υe(I∗
j
) ≥ η and Υr(I∗
j
) ≤ η
Υe(I∗
j
), otherwise
(1)
Similarly, the payment of the ith task requester is given as:
Pri (τi) =



η, if Υe(I∗
j
) ≤ η and Υr(I∗
j
) ≥ η
Υr(I∗
j
), otherwise
(2)
In this problem set-up, for any particular time slot τi ∈  there
might be two types of agents: (a) Freshly arrived agents, (b)
Still active agents. For freshly arrived task executers and task
requesters the payment is calculated as shown below. More
formally, the payment of ith task requester is given as:
ζr(τi) =



maxρr∈[dˆr
i
−κ,..., τi]
{Pr
i
(ρr)}, if task requester is freshly
arrived
max{ζr(τi−1),P
r
i
(τi)}, if task requester are still
active
(3)
Here κ is the maximum permitted gap between the arrival and
departure of any arbitrary agent i.
ζe(τi) =



minρe∈[dˆe
i
−κ,..., τi]
{Pe
i
(ρe)}, if task executer is freshly
arrived
min{ζe(τi−1),P
e
i
(τi)}, if task executers are still
active
(4)
Now, if after τi time slots if a task requester i is a winner
then the final payment of that task requester will be given
by Pr
i
(τi) = max{ζ
r(τi−1),P
r
i
(τi)} and similarly if after τi
time slots if a task executer i is a winner then the final
payment of that task executer will be given by Pe
i
(τi) =
min{ζe(τi−1),P
e
i
(τi)}.
4) Allocation: The input to the allocation phase are the jth
cluster in τi time slot i.e. £
i
j
, the set of task requester R, the set
of cost of task execution of task executers i.e. γe, and the set
of values of task requesters i.e. γr. The output is the set of task
requester-task executer winning pairs held in Ak. Line 3 sorts
the cluster £i
j
in ascending order based on the elements of Pe
and held in U∗c data structure. The set of active task requesters
are sorted in descending order based on the elements of Pr
and held in Rc data structure.
Algorithm 4 Allocation (£i
j
, R, γe, γr)
1: Ak ← φ
2: begin
3: U∗c ← S ort ascend(£
i
j
, Si · χ
e
i
) ⊲ Sorting based on
χe
i
∈ Pe for all Si ∈ £
i
j
4: Rc ← S ort descend(R, Bi · χ
r
i
) ⊲ Sorting based on
χr
i
∈ Pr for all Bi ∈ R
5: I j ← argmaxi{χ
r
i
− χe
i
≥ 0}
6: for k = 1 to I j do
7: U˚c ← U˚c ∪ {Sk ∈ U
∗
c }
8: R˚ ← R˚ ∪ {Bi ∈ Rc}
9: Ak ← Ak ∪ (U˚c, R˚)
10: end for
11: U∗c ← U
∗
c \ U˚c
12: Rc ← Rc \ R˚
13: return (Ak, U
∗
c , Rc)
14: end
Line 5 determines the largest index i that satisfy the con-
dition that χr
i
− χe
i
≥ 0. The for loop in line 6-10 iterates
over the I j winning task executer-task requester pairs. In
line 7 U˚c data structure keeps track of all the winning task
executers at a particular time slot τi and in a particular cluster
£
j
i
. The R˚ data structure keeps track of all the I j winning
task requesters. The Ak data structure in line 9 keeps track
of all the winning task executer-task requester pairs. Line
11 and 12 removes the winning task executers and winning
task requesters respectively from the auction market. Line 13
returns the allocation set Ak, U
∗
c , and Rc.
C. Analysis of STEM
The STEM is a four stage mechanism consists of: main
routine, cluster formation, allocation, and payment. So, the
6running time of STEM will be the sum of the running time of
main routine, cluster formation, allocation, and payment. Line
2 of the main routine is bounded above by O(1). The for loop
in line 3 executes for s+1 times as we have s time slots. For the
analysis purpose, WLOG we have n ≥ m. Line 4 will take O(n)
time as there are n task executers. Line 5 is bounded above by
O(m) as there are m task requesters. Line 6-8 is bounded above
by O(n). The time taken by line 9-11 in worst case is given by
O(m). Considering the cluster formation phase, in a given time
horizon it is bounded above by O(c×k×n) = O(ckn); where c is
number of iterations for which the change in the clusters are to
be calculated. The sorting in line 14 and 15 is bounded above
by O(n lg n) and O(m lgm) respectively. Now, talking about the
payment phase motivated by [4], for k different clusters line
3-28 will take O(k× κ×n2) = O(kκn2); where κ is the patience
bound. Line 29 in the payment phase calls the allocation phase
that will contribute O(n lg n) + O(m lgm) in the worst case.
So, the overall time complexity is dominated by the payment
phase and is given as O(k × κ × n2) = O(kκn2). Line 17-20
in main routine phase is bounded above by O(n). Line 25
and 26 takes O(n) and O(m) time respectively. The overall
running time of the STEM is: O(n)+O(m) +O(n) +O(ckn)+
O(n lg n)+O(m lgm)+O(kκn2)+O(n)+O(n)+O(m) = O(kκn2).
The analysis is carried out by considering the case n ≥ m,
similarly the case with m ≥ n can be tackled and will result
in O(kκm2).
Lemma 1. Agent i can’t gain by misreporting their arrival
time or departure time or both.
Proof. As the agents can mis-report the arrival time or the
departure time, so the proof can be illustrated into two parts
considering both the cases separately.
• Case 1 (aˆe
i
, ae
i
): Fix de
i
, τi. Let us suppose an agent
i reports the arrival time as aˆe
i
such that aˆe
i
, ae
i
or in
more formal sense aˆe
i
> ae
i
. It means that, an agent i will
be aligned with more number of time slots before win-
ning when reporting aˆe
i
than in the case when reporting
truthfully i.e. ae
i
as shown in Fig. 2. Now, it is seen from
the construction of the payment function that the agent
i will be paid less than or equal to the payment he/she
(henceforth he) is receiving when reporting truthfully.
a
e
i
aˆ
e
i
d
e
i
t ∈ max[de
i
−k,...,ae
i
]{P
e
i } ≥ max[dei−k,...,aˆei ]{P
e
i }
τ1
d
e
i
τsτ2 τ3
(de
i
− k)
Fig. 2. An agent i mis-reporting arrival time ae
i
• Case 2 (dˆe
i
, de
i
): Fix ae
i
, τi. Let us suppose an agent
i reports the departure time as dˆe
i
such that dˆe
i
, de
i
or
in more formal sense dˆe
i
< de
i
. It means that, an agent i
will be aligned with more number of time slots before
becoming inactive when reporting dˆe
i
than in the case
when reporting truthfully i.e. de
i
as shown in Fig. 3. Now,
it is seen from the construction of the payment function is
that the agent i will be paid less or equal to the payment
he is paid when reporting truthfully.
a
e
i
d
e
i
t ∈ max[de
i
−k,...,ae
i
]{P
e
i } ≥ max[dˆe
i
−k,...,ae
i
]{P
e
i }
τ1
dˆ
e
i
τsτ2 τ3
(de
i
− k)(dˆe
i
− k) ae
i
Fig. 3. An agent i mis-reporting departure time de
i
Considering the case 1 and case 2 above, it can be concluded
that any agent i can’t gain by mis-reporting arrival time or
departure time. The proof is carried out by considering the
task executers, similar argument can be given for the task
requesters. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 2. Agent i can’t gain by misreporting his/her bid
value.
Proof. Considering the case of task executers. Fix the time
slot τi ∈  and the cluster.
Case 1:
Let us suppose that the ith winning task executer deviates and
reports a bid value υˆe
i
> υe
i
. As the task executer was winning
with υe
i
, with υˆe
i
he would continue to win and his utility
ϕˆe
i
= ϕe
i
. If instead he reports υˆe
i
< υe
i
. Again two cases can
happen. He can still win. If he wins his utility, according to
the definition will be ϕˆe
i
= ϕe
i
. If he loses his utility will be
ϕˆe
i
= 0 < ϕe
i
.
Case 2:
If the ith task executer was losing with υi let us see whether he
would gain by deviation. If he reports υˆe
i
< υe
i
, he would still
lose and his utility ϕˆe
i
= 0 = ϕe
i
. If instead he reports υˆe
i
> υe
i
.
Two cases can occur. If he still loses his utility ϕˆe
i
= 0 = ϕe
i
.
But if he wins, then he had to beat some valuation υe
j
> υe
i
and hence υˆe
i
> υe
j
. Now as he wins his utility ϕˆe
i
= Pe
i
− υe
i
=
υe
j
− υe
i
< 0. So he would have got a negative utility. Hence
no gain is achieved.
Considering the case 1 and case 2 above, it can be concluded
that any agent i cant gain by mis-reporting his bid value. The
proof is carried out by considering the task executers, similar
argument can be given for the task requesters. This completes
the proof. 
Lemma 3. STEM is weakly Budget balanced.
Proof. Fix the time slot τi and cluster £
i
j
. This corresponds
to the case when the sum of all the monetary transfers of all
the agents type profiles is less than or equal to zero. Now, the
construction of our STEM is such that, any task executer and
task requester is paired up only when Si · P
e
i
− Bi · P
r
i
≥ 0.
It means that, for any task executer-task requester pair there
exist some surplus. In the similar fashion, in a particular time
slot τi and in a particular cluster considering all the agents,∑
i Si · P
e
i
−
∑
iBi · P
r
i
≥ 0. Hence, the sum total of payments
made to the task executers is at least as high as the sum total
of the payments received by the task requestersand their is a
surplus. Hence, it is proved that the STEM is budget balanced
for a particular time slot τi and for a particular cluster. From
7our claim it must be true for any time slot τi . . . τs and any
cluster. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 4. STEM is individual rational.
Proof. Fix the time slot τi and cluster £
i
j
. Individual rationality
means that each agent gains a utility that is no less than he
would get without participating in a mechanism. Considering
the case of task requester, when the task requester is winning
then it is ensured that he has to pay an amount Pr
i
such that
υˆr
i
≥ Pr
i
. From this inequality it is clear that the winning task
requester has to pay amount less than his bid value. So, in
this case it can be concluded that ϕr
i
= υˆr
i
−Pr
i
≥ 0. Moreover,
if the task requester is losing in that case his utility is 0. From
our claim it must be true for any time slot τi . . . τs and any
cluster. Similar argument can be given for the task executers.
This completes the proof. 
V. Conclusion and future works
An incentive compatible mechanism is proposed in this
paper to circumvent the location information in online double
auction setting for the participatory sensing. In our future
work we will focus on investigating the quality consequence
in this environment. Another interesting direction is to find al-
gorithms when the task requesters have some limited budgets.
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